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WHO SHOULD BEAR THE BURDEN OF EXPERIMENTAL
MEDICAL DEVICE TESTING: THE PREEMPTIVE SCOPE
OF THE MEDICAL DEVICE AMENDMENTS UNDER
SLATER v. OPTICAL RADIATION CORP.
INTRODUCTION
In 1984, Albert Slater had a cataract removed from his left eye,'
and rather than face potential blindness, he chose to undergo an
experimental procedure in which his natural lens was replaced with
an intraocular lens implant.' The implant, manufactured by Optical
Radiation Corporation ("ORC"),3 was inserted into Mr. Slater's
eye as part of a clinical investigation conducted pursuant to the
Medical Device Amendments to the Federal Food, Drug, and Cos-
metic Act of 19384 and the regulations pertaining to intraocular
lenses.' Prior to the procedure, Mr. Slater signed a consent form
indicating that he recognized that he was taking part in a clinical
investigation.6
Over the next several years, the vision in Mr. Slater's left eye
deteriorated and he was in continuous pain.7 After he was diagnosed
as suffering from cystoid macular edema, 8 Mr. Slater's doctors rec-
ommended that his intraocular lens implant be taken out.' The lens
was subsequently removed, leaving Mr. Slater with permanent dam-
age to his left eye, damage greater than that done by the cataract
1. 961 F.2d 1330, 1332 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 327 (1992). For a discussion of the
problems and effects of cataracts, see Alfred Mamelok, Cataract, in 3 ROSCOE N. GRAY & Lou-
ISE J. GORDY. ATTORNEYS' TEXTBOOK OF MEDICINE T 56.45, at 56-50 to -52 (3d ed. 1991).
2. See DAVID J. APPLE ET AL.. INTRAOCULAR LENSES: EVOLUTION. DESIGNS, COMPLICATIONS,
AND PATHOLOGY 4-5 (1989) (stating that international and federal studies show that between
twelve to fifteen million people worldwide are blind due to cataracts).
3. Slater, 961 F.2d at 1332.
4. 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-93 (1988).
5. 21 C.F.R. §§ 813.1-.170 (1992).
6. Slater, 961 F.2d at 1332.
7. Id.
8. Slater v. Optical Radiation Corp., 756 F. Supp. 370, 371 (N.D. Ill. 1991), afd, 961 F.2d
1330 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 327 (1992). Cystoid macular edema is a degenerative eye
condition involving an accumulation of an excess amount of watery fluid in the posterior pole of
the eye. STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY 443-44 (24th ed. 1982).
9. Slater. 961 F.2d at 1332.
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW
itself."
In 1989, Mr. Slater filed a product liability action against ORC
in the federal district court for the Northern District of Illinois."
On a motion for summary judgment, the district court held that Mr.
Slater's state law claims were preempted by the Investigational De-
vice Exemption for intraocular lenses contained in the Medical De-
vice Amendments. 2 Mr. Slater appealed the decision, and in Slater
v. Optical Radiation Corp.,13 a case of first impression at the appel-
late level, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. 4
Like Albert Slater, many people agree to participate in clinical
investigation programs involving experimental medical devices, some
of which result in injuries to the participants. 5 According to the
Slater decision, plaintiffs do not have a cause of action against the
manufacturer of a defective experimental medical device based on
the safety and effectiveness of the device, and therefore are divested
of any state tort remedies which would otherwise be available to
them.' 6 Moreover, the court found that no federal damages remedy
exists, either. 17
Congress's intention in enacting the Medical Device Amendments
was not to leave plaintiffs like Mr. Slater to bear the burdens of
experimental medical device testing on their own. Rather, the pur-
pose of the Medical Device Amendments was to vest the Food and
Drug Administration ("FDA") with the increased responsibility of
ensuring that medical devices marketed in the United States are
safe and effective.' The effect of allowing a decision like Slater to
10. Id.
11. Slater v. Optical Radiation Corp., 756 F. Supp. 370 (N.D. I1. 1991).
12. Id. at 374.
13. 961 F.2d 1330 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 327 (1992).
14. Slater, 961 F.2d at 1334.
15. Jennifer S. R. Lynn, Implantable Medical Devices: A Survey of Products Liability Case
Law. 38 MED. TRIAL TECH. Q. 44, 44 (1992). According to one writer:
There are nearly 200 body parts that can either be replaced by an implant or their
function taken over by an installed device. Some of the implantable devices are life-
saving, others facilitate recovery and restore function, and still others make life more
productive physically and/or emotionally. As with natural organs and systems, im-
plants fail. Some wear out and some are failures due to defects. Some failures can be
catastrophic, and other failures can result in a return of disability. Some implants
have adverse effects which may result in deleterious effects - adding to the person's
problems.
Id.
16. Slater, 961 F.2d at 1333-34.
17. Id. at 1333 (emphasis added).
18. S. REP. No. 33, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 1-2 (1975), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1070,
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stand is that if a manufacturer defectively designs an experimental
product, injured plaintiffs like Mr. Slater have no remedy.
This Note discusses the alleged preemptive effect of the Medical
Device Amendments on state tort claims based on the safety and
effectiveness of experimental intraocular lenses. Specifically, it ad-
dresses the Seventh Circuit's finding of express preemption and con-
cludes that such a finding is erroneous. It also examines the legisla-
tive history of the Medical Device Amendments and discusses
whether state tort claims against experimental intraocular lens man-
ufacturers are impliedly preempted. In addition, this Note analyzes
the difference between judicial and state regulation treatment of tort
claims in the preemption arena. This Note concludes that a finding
of preemption is inconsistent with the rationale behind holding man-
ufacturers like ORC liable for defects in their products.
I. BACKGROUND
To fully comprehend the Seventh Circuit's holding in Slater, one
must understand the doctrine of preemption generally as well as
how it specifically occurs under the Medical Device Amendments.
A. The Doctrine of Federal Preemption
It is a well-established principle that the Supremacy Clause in-
validates state laws that interfere with, or are contrary to, federal
law;19 this includes not only the United States Constitution, treaties,
and statutes, but also regulations promulgated by federal agencies.2
The doctrine of federal preemption preserves the federal govern-
ment's authority in areas that Congress has deemed to be national
in scope.2 1 In addition to national interest concerns, the federal gov-
1070-71. For a detailed explanation of the FDA regulatory process, see Bryan J. Maedgen &
Sheree Lynn McCall, A Survey of Law Regarding the Liability of Manufacturers and Sellers of
Drug and Medical Devices, 18 ST. MARY'S L.J. 395, 442 (1986).
19. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. The Supremacy Clause provides:
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursu-
ance thereof; and all Treaties made, under the Authority of the United States, shall
be the supreme law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound
thereby; any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary
notwithstanding.
Id.
20. For cases holding that the federal regulations preempt state law as effectively as federal
statutes, see Hillsborough County v. Automated Medical Labs., 471 U.S. 707 (1985); Fidelity
Fed. Sav. & Loan Assoc. v. De La Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 153 (1982).
21. De La Cuesta, 458 U.S. at 153-54; see also Susan Bartlett Foote, Administrative Preemp-
19941 . 965
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ernment also retains the power to regulate areas where it believes
state laws are inadequate or inconsistent. For instance, Congress,
believing that state and local regulation of consumer products was
inadequate, created the federal Consumer Product Safety Commis-
sion.22 Inconsistent protection by the states also led to the enactment
of the Occupational Health and Safety Act ("OSHA").2"
Even though the Constitution vests supreme legislative power in
Congress, the Framers were equally concerned with preserving state
autonomy. 4 In The Federalist No. 45, James Madison stated that
the powers delegated by the Constitution to the federal government
are "few and defined," and that those preserved for the states are
"numerous and indefinite."' 25  Madison believed that the states
should govern "all of the objects, which, in the ordinary course of
affairs, concern the lives, liberties and properties of the people
... ,"2 Consequently, the states have traditionally managed those
areas that concern the lives of their citizens, most notably the areas
of health and safety. 27 For this reason, federal courts defer to the
states on these issues in the face of federal preemption. 8
tion: An Experiment in Regulatory Federalism, 70 VA. L. REV. 1429, 1432 (1984) [hereinafter
Foote, Experiment] ("The Framers of the Constitution understood that supreme federal power
was essential to coherent national government.").
22. 15 U.S.C. § 2053 (1988). The Consumer Product Safety Act provides: "The Congress finds
that . . . control by State and local governments of unreasonable risks of injury associated with
consumer products is inadequate. ... Id. § 2051(a)(4).
23. 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-78 (1988); see also S. REP. No. 1282, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1970),
reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5177, 5180 ("[Only a relatively few states have modern laws
relating to occupational health and safety and have devoted adequate resources to their adminis-
tration and enforcement. Moreover, in a state-by-state approach, the efforts of the more vigorous
states are inevitably undermined by the shortsightedness of others.").
24. THE FEDERALIST No. 45, at 292 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
25. Id.
26. Id. at 293.
27. DeCanas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 356 (1976) (holding that the states have broad authority to
regulate issues of health and safety). Various courts have held that the states have an interest in
providing their citizens with compensation for health-related injuries. E.g., Silkwood v. Kerr-Mc-
Gee Corp., 464 U.S. 238 (1984); San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 244
(1959); Ferebee v. Chevron Chem. Co., 736 F.2d 1529, 1543 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S.
1062 (1984); Graham v. Wyeth Labs., 666 F. Supp. 1483, 1491 (D. Kan. 1987), later proceeding,
906 F.2d 1399 (10th Cir.), later proceeding, 906 F.2d 1419 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S.
981 (1990).
28. Raymond Motor Transp., Inc. v. Rice, 434 U.S. 429, 443 (1978) (noting that "the Court
has been most reluctant to invalidate under the Commerce Clause 'state legislation in the field of
safety where the propriety of local regulation has long been recognized' ") (citations omitted).
[Vol. 43:963
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1. Types of Federal Preemption
There are two general types of federal preemption: express and
implied. 9 Express preemption occurs when Congress explicitly pro-
hibits state regulation of a certain area.30 Implied preemption, on
the other hand, can occur in one of three situations: (1) when the
federal regulations involved are so comprehensive that state law is
displaced; (2) when there is a dominant federal interest in the sub-
ject matter to be regulated; or (3) when there is a direct conflict
between the federal and state laws at issue. 31
a. Express Preemption
Congress must explicitly declare that state law on a certain issue
is preempted for express preemption to occur.32 When Congress ex-
pressly states such an intention, the results are clear and
unambiguous.
For example, the Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act ("Ciga-
rette Act")3 3 provides: "No statement relating to smoking and
health, other than the statement required by section 1333 of this
title, shall be required on any cigarette package.' This provision of
the Cigarette Act was interpreted in Cipollone v. Liggett Group,
Inc.,35 where a smoker sued a cigarette manufacturer after she con-
tracted lung cancer.36 The plaintiff asserted, inter alia, that the
manufacturer had failed to warn her of the dangers of cigarette
smoking.37 The cigarette manufacturer maintained that the plain-
29. Hillsborough County v. Automated Medical Labs., 471 U.S. 707, 713 (1985). See gener-
ally JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D, ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 311-30 (4th ed. 1991)
(discussing federal regulation and state authority).
30. See, e.g., Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 112 S. Ct. 2608 (1992) (holding that the plain-
tiff's -failure to warn" claim was expressly preempted by a federal statute setting forth the warn-
ing label to be placed on cigarette packages); Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525
(1977) (holding that a state labeling requirement which used a different formula for determining
the net weight to be reported on the label of packaged bacon was expressly preempted by a con-
gressional prohibition on labeling, packaging, or ingredient requirements different from or in addi-
tion to those required by the federal statute).
31. Hillsborough, 471 U.S. at 713. See generally NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 29, 311-30
(discussing federal regulation and state authority).
32. See supra note 30 and accompanying text (explaining and giving examples of express
preemption).
33. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331-41 (1988).
34. Id. § 1334.
35. 112 S. Ct. 2608 (1992).




tiff's claim was expressly preempted by the Cigarette Act.3 8 The Su-
preme Court agreed with the manufacturer and held that because
the Cigarette Act clearly stated that no warning label other than
that mandated by the Cigarette Act was required, the plaintiff's
claim was expressly preempted.39
It is presumed that state law is not expressly preempted unless
Congress explicitly states that such preemption is to occur.40 There-
fore, absent a clear expression of intent from Congress, state law
will not be displaced by federal law.4'
b. Implied Preemption
In the absence of express preemption, courts are left to decide
whether a state law is impliedly preempted. 42 The United States Su-
preme Court, in Hillsborough County v. Automated Medical Labo-
ratories,3 outlined the ways in which implied preemption can arise:
(1) when federal regulations are so comprehensive that state law is
displaced; (2) when there is a dominant federal interest in the sub-
ject matter to be regulated; or (3) when there is direct conflict be-
tween the federal and state laws at issue.44 When any of these situa-
tions exist, courts will find implied preemption of state law.
Congressional intent, however, must be considered when determin-
ing whether any of these tests are satisfied. 5
38. Id. at 2614.
39. Id. at 2621.
40. E.g., Graham v. Wyeth Labs., 666 F. Supp. 1483, 1489 (D. Kan. 1987) ("In the absence of
express preemption, there is a strong presumption that Congress did not intend to displace state
law.") (citation omitted), later proceeding, 906 F.2d 1399 (10th Cir.), later proceeding, 906 F.2d
1419 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 981 (1990); (citation omitted); see also NOWAK & Ro-
TUNDA. supra note 29, at 315 (noting that "[t]he Supreme Court presumes that Congress does not
intend to preempt state legislation unless there is a clear indication from the language or purposes
of the federal action or regulation").
41. E.g., Hillsborough County v. Automated Medical Labs., 471 U.S. 707 (1985); Abbot v.
American Cyanamid Co., 844 F.2d 1108 (4th Cir. 1988); MacGillivray v. Lederle Labs., 667 F.
Supp. 743 (D.N.M. 1987); Graham v. Wyeth Labs., 666 F. Supp. 1483 (D. Kan. 1987), later
proceeding, 906 F.2d 1399 (1Oth Cir.), later proceeding, 906 F.2d 1419 (10th Cir.), cert. denied,
498 U.S. 981 (1990).
42. E.g., California Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272 (1987); Hillsborough,
471 U.S. 707 (1985); Jones v. Ruth Packing Co., 430 U.S. 579 (1977); see also NOWAK &
ROTUNDA. supra note 29, at 314-15 (discussing the steps used in ascertaining congressional intent
to preempt state regulation).
43. 471 U.S. 707 (1985).
44. Id. at 713.
45. Id. at 714.
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i. Comprehensive Federal Regulations
State law may be displaced when the federal regulations involved
are deemed so comprehensive that there is no room for the states to
regulate the subject and it is reasonable to infer that Congress in-
tended to preempt state law.46 For example, in Schneidewind v.
ANR Pipeline Co.,4 the Supreme Court was faced with a Michigan
statute that required public utilities transporting natural gas in
Michigan to obtain approval from the Michigan Public Service
Commission ("MPSC") before issuing long-term securities.48 Sev-
eral natural gas companies, which served customers in Michigan as
well as in other states, filed suit seeking a declaratory judgment that
the MPSC lacked jurisdiction over their securities issues because
the Michigan statute was preempted by the Natural Gas Act of
1938.49 Relying on the fact that the federal government - through
the Natural Gas Act - comprehensively regulates the natural gas
industry, the Court held that the Michigan statute was impliedly
preempted. 50
ii. Dominant Federal Interest
State law may also be displaced under the implied preemption
doctrine when there is a dominant federal interest in the subject
matter. 1 The Supreme Court discussed this type of implied preemp-
tion in Hines v. Davidowitz.52 In Hines, the Court was called upon
to determine the validity of a Pennsylvania alien registration statute
in light of the federal Alien Registration Act of 1940.s Pennsylva-
nia characterized its statute as a local police measure designed to
protect the citizens and property of the state.54
In holding that the Pennsylvania statute was impliedly preempted
by the federal statute, the Court focused on the fact that the federal
46. Id. at 713.
47. 485 U.S. 293 (1988).
48. Id. at 296-97.
49. Id. at 298.
50. Id. at 300-09. With respect to the Natural Gas Act, the Court said that it has "long been
recognized as a 'comprehensive scheme of federal regulation of "all wholesales of natural gas in
interstate commerce.' " Id. at 300 (quoting Northern Natural Gas Co. v. State Corp. Comm'n,
372 U.S. 84, 91 (1963)).
51. Hillsborough County v. Automated Medical Labs., 471 U.S. 707, 713 (1985).
52. 312 U.S. 52 (1941).
53. Id. at 59-60.
54. Id. at 55.
1994]
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government has a dominant interest in foreign affairs, specifically
the power to regulate immigration.5" The Court stated: "Experience
has shown that international controversies of the gravest moment
sometimes even leading to war, may arise from real or imagined
wrongs to another's subjects inflicted, or permitted, by a govern-
ment."56 Because the federal statute was designed to protect the
personal liberties of all aliens through one uniform system, thus pro-
tecting them from the possibility of inquisitorial practices that
might affect international relations, the Pennsylvania statute was
preempted." The Hines decision illustrates how an act of Congress
in a field in which the federal government has a dominant interest
precludes enforcement of state laws on the same subject.
iii. Direct Conflict Between State and Federal Law
Finally, state law may be displaced when it directly conflicts with
federal law.58 Direct conflict can occur in two different situations.
First, direct conflict can arise when compliance with both a state
law and the federal regulatory scheme is not possible. 59 Direct con-
flict may also occur when state law frustrates Congress's purpose in
enacting the federal law.60
When it is impossible to obey state and federal regulations simul-
taneously, the state statute will be held invalid. 61 The Supreme
Court addressed this type of direct conflict implied preemption in
McDermott v. Wisconsin. 2 In McDermott, the Court examined
Wisconsin's syrup labeling regulations, 63 under which an out-of-
state syrup labeled in accordance with relevant federal regulations
was considered to be mislabeled under Wisconsin law."" Because
joint compliance was impossible, the Court barred enforcement of
55. Id. at 62.
56. Id. at 64.
57. Id. at 74.
58. E.g., Hillsborough County v. Automated Medical Labs., 471 U.S. 707, 713 (1985); Capital
Cities Cable, Inc. v. Crisp, 467 U.S. 691, 699 (1984); Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v.
Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142-43 (1963).
59. E.g., Hillsborough, 471 U.S. at 713; Capital Cities, 467 U.S. at 699; Hines v. Davidowitz,
312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941); see also NOWAK & ROTUNDA. supra note 29, at 312 (discussing the
preemption test created by the Hines Court).
60. Hill v. Florida, 325 U.S. 538, 542 (1945); see infra notes 66-70 and accompanying text
(discussing the Hill decision).
61. Hillsborough, 471 U.S. at 713.
62. 228 U.S. 115 (1913).
63. Id. at 133.
64. Id. at 125-27.
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the Wisconsin regulations.65
A second type of implied preemption involving direct conflict was
addressed in Hill v. Florida,6   which involved a Florida statute
which placed certain restrictions on labor union bargaining activi-
ties.67 At issue in the case was the question of whether or not the
state statute was preempted by the National Labor Relations Act. 68
The Court held that the Florida statute conflicted with the workers'
free bargaining rights provided by the Act;6 9 since the state statute
"[stood] as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the
full purposes and objectives of Congress," it was preempted.7"
In order to find implied preemption, however, courts must first
overcome certain presumptions against preemption. First, courts as-
sume that in the absence of express preemption, Congress does not
intend to displace state law.71 Second, courts are reluctant to find a
state law impliedly preempted when the state law deals with areas
traditionally occupied by the states, such as regulation of matters
related to health and safety.72 Finally, there is a presumption oper-
ating against preemption when the preemption of state tort claims
would leave plaintiffs without a remedy.7" Despite these presump-
65. Id. at 134.
66. 325 U.S. 538 (1945).
67. Id. at 539.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 541.
70. Id. at 542.
71. Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 746 (1981) (noting that the preemption inquiry
"starts with the basic assumption that Congress did not intend to displace state law"); see also
Graham v. Wyeth Labs., 666 F. Supp. 1483, 1489 (D. Kan. 1987) ("in the absence of express
preemption, there is a strong presumption that Congress did not intend to displace state law."),
later proceeding, 906 F.2d 1399 (10th Cir.), later proceeding, 906 F.2d 1419 (10th Cir.), cert.
denied, 498 U.S. 981 (1990); NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 29, at 315 (noting that the Su-
preme Court presumes that Congress does not intend to preempt state law without clear language
or federal purpose).
72. Hillsborough County v. Automated Medical Labs., 471 U.S. 707 (1985) (holding that the
intent to preempt may not be inferred merely from the comprehensiveness of federal regulation);
Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525 (1977) (holding that state law must yield to federal
law only when there is clear congressional intent that federal law control); see also Rice v. Santa
Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 236 (1947) (holding that when such historic police powers are at
issue, preemption will not occur "unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress").
73. Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238 (1984). In Silkwood, the defendants claimed
that the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2011-296 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992), preempted
all state law remedies. Silkwood, 464 U.S. at 240-46. The court held that state tort remedies were
not preempted and stated:
This silence [regarding the preemption of state remedies] takes on added significance
in light of Congress' failure to provide any federal remedy for persons injured by such
conduct. It is difficult to believe that Congress would, without comment, remove all
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 43:963
tions, however, state law may be found to be impliedly preempted.
2. Preemption of State Regulation v. State Common Law Claims
Once federal preemption is found to exist, the courts must deter-
mine exactly what is preempted by the federal enactment. Specifi-
cally, courts must determine whether only state regulatory law is
preempted or whether the preemption also includes state common
law. It is clear that state regulation and state tort law claims have
been treated differently in the preemption arena," although some
courts do not subscribe to such a distinction. 75
Some courts are more likely to displace state-mandated regula-
tions than to displace traditional state common law causes of ac-
tion. 76 The distinction between state regulation and state common
law was explained in Ferebee v. Chevron Chemical Co.77 Ferebee
involved the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act
("FIFRA"),78 which prescribes labeling requirements for paraquat,
a toxic agricultural herbicide. In Ferebee, an agricultural worker at
a government research center brought an action against Chevron
means of judicial recourse to those injured by illegal conduct.
Id. at 251. Maybe even more significant was Justice Harry Blackmun's dissenting opinion in
Silkwood. Justice Blackmun believed that only punitive damage awards were preempted and that
there was no congressional intent to preempt compensatory state tort claims, and he stressed the
important role that states play in compensating their injured citizens. Id. at 263 (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting); see also Abbot v. American Cyanamid Co., 844 F.2d 1108, 1112 (4th Cir. 1988)
(holding that the lack of a federal remedy works against a finding of implied preemption). But see
Lister v. Stark, 890 F.2d 941, 946 (7th Cir. 1989) ("[T]he availability of a federal remedy is not
a prerequisite for federal preemption."). It should be noted that although the Lister court held
that the provision of a federal remedy is not required, the court found that while ERISA provided
some form of a federal remedy, the federal system did not provide the exact remedy the plaintiff
sought. Id.
74. For an excellent discussion of the dichotomy between state regulation and state common
law, see Marc Z. Edell & Cynthia A. Walters, The Doctrine of Implied Preemption in Products
Liability Cases - Federalism in the Balance, 54 TENN. L. REV, 603 (1987); see also Interna-
tional Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481 (1987); San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon,
359 U.S. 236 (1959) (both holding that a distinction between state common law and state statutes
exists).
75. See Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238 (1984) (holding that no distinction exists
between state common law and state statutes); Ferebee v. Chevron Chem. Co., 736 F.2d 1529
(D.C. Cir.) (failing to find the existence of such a distinction), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1062 (1984).
76. Compare Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238 (1984) (preserving state common
law claims in the face of federal regulation) with EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226 (1983) (find-
ing that federal law preempted state imposition of a mandatory retirement age for game wardens)
and Xerox Corp. v. County of Harris, 459 U.S. 145 (1982) (holding that a federal customs regu-
lation preempted a state-imposed property tax on goods stored by customers).
77. 736 F.2d 1529 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1062 (1984).
78. 7 U.S.C. § 136 (1988).
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Chemical, the manufacturer of paraquat, alleging that his lung dis-
ease and subsequent death resulted from Chevron's failure to place
adequate warning labels on its product.7 9 FIFRA precludes a state
from imposing any requirements for the labeling of paraquat in ad-
dition to or different from those required by FIFRA, 80 so in deter-
mining whether FIFRA preempted the relevant state tort claims,
the court examined whether the statute specifically addresses state
tort claims and found that it did not.8 1 Consequently, the court held
that FIFRA does not preempt state damage actions, but merely pre-
cludes states from directly ordering changes in labels approved by
the federal statute. 2
Although some courts distinguish between state regulation and
state common law tort claims, other courts have held that state tort
compensation is akin to state regulation. For example, Palmer v.
Liggett Group, Inc.83 involved a cigarette smoker's claim against a
cigarette manufacturer based on its failure to warn consumers of
the dangers of cigarette smoking.8 ' In finding that the plaintiff's
claims were preempted by the Cigarette Act,85 the court rejected
the characterization of compensatory awards based on a failure to
warn of the dangers of cigarette smoking as indirect rather than
regulatory.86 The court reasoned that since a jury verdict effectively
compels a manufacturer to alter its cigarette labels, it has the same
effect as a state regulation ordering the manufacturer to conform to
state law requirements different from or in addition to the federal
requirements. 8 7
79. Ferebee, 736 F.2d at 1533. His estate continued the action after his death. Id. at 1529.
80. Id. at 1540; 7 U.S.C. § 136 (1988).
81. Ferebee, 736 F.2d at 1540.
82. Id. at 1542. In determining that the plaintiffs common law claims were not preempted, the
court also considered whether or not the statute provided a federal remedy and found that it did
not. Id. In addition, the court assumed that health and safety issues are not to be preempted
absent a clear manifestation of Congress's intent. Id. at 1542-43.
83. 825 F.2d 620 (1st Cir. 1987).
84. Id. at 622.
85. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331-41 (1988); see supra note 34 and accompanying text (detailing a por-
tion of the Cigarette Act's provisions).
86. Palmer, 825 F.2d at 627.
87. Id. at 627-28. It should be noted that the Palmer court relied on San Diego Bldg. Trades.
Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959), a decision in which the Supreme Court stated: "Regula-
tion can be as effectively exerted through an award of damages as through some form of preven-
tive relief. The obligation to pay compensation can be, indeed is designed to be, a potent method
of governing conduct and controlling policy." Id. at 247 (quoted in Palmer, 825 F.2d at 628).
Justice John Harlan authored a concurring opinion in Garmon which discussed the decision's lim-
ited applicability and stated that preemption of state tort law remedies would only occur to the
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In summary, even though the federal government has the power
under the Supremacy Clause to displace state law, the Framers of
the Constitution were equally concerned with preserving the power
of the states.88 Issues relating to health and safety are generally re-
served for the states, although the federal government does step in
where state protection is inadequate or disparate.89 When the fed-
eral government decides to preempt state law, it may do so either
expressly or impliedly. Express preemption occurs when Congress
clearly states an intent to preempt state law on a certain subject;9 °
implied preemption occurs when Congress indirectly indicates its in-
tent to preempt. 91 However, certain presumptions must be overcome
before courts will find that a state law has been impliedly pre-
empted.92 Finally, state common law, as opposed to state or local
regulation, is more likely to be preserved in the face of federal
preemption.93
B. Preemption Under the Medical Device Amendments
In 1976, Congress enacted the Medical Device Amendments
("MDA" or "Amendments") to the Federal Food, Drug, and Cos-
metic Act of 1938. 9" The purpose behind the MDA was to bolster
the FDA's authority over the regulation of medical devices.9 5 With
the enactment of the Amendments, the FDA assumed the increased
responsibility of ensuring that all drugs and devices marketed in the
extent that they had been displaced by federal law. Garmon, 359 U.S. at 252 (Harlan, J., concur-
ring). Because Palmer did not involve preemption of a state remedy to the extent that it was being
replaced by a federal remedy, some scholars have argued that the Palmer court's reliance on
Garmon was clearly misplaced. Edell & Walters, supra note 74, at 607-13.
88. See supra notes 24-28 and accompanying text (discussing how the Framers were not only
concerned with preserving state autonomy, but also with having the states manage the areas which
concern people's lives).
89. See supra notes 22-23 and accompanying text (noting that inadequate state protection of
consumers led to the enactment of the Consumer Product Safety Commission and OSHA).
90. See supra notes 32-41 and accompanying text (discussing express preemption).
91. See supra notes 42-70 and accompanying text (explaining implied preemption and the three
instances in which it occurs).
92. See supra notes 71-73 and accompanying text (delineating the presumptions that courts
make in determining whether state law is preempted).
93. See supra notes 74-87 and accompanying text (discussing the preservation of state common
law as opposed to the preservation of regulatory law).
94. 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-93 (1988).
95. See generally Susan Bartlett Foote, Loops and Loopholes: Hazardous Device Regulation
Under the 1976 Medical Device Amendments to the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 7 ECOLOGY
LQ 101 (1978) [hereinafter Foote, Loops and Loopholes] (explaining how enactment of the
Amendments expanded the FDA's power).
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United States are safe and effective. 96 Prior to 1976, manufacturers
were not required to establish the safety and efficacy of a device
before marketing it.9 7 Under the current federal legislation, how-
ever, a medical device must satisfy rigorous safety standards and
obtain FDA approval before it can be marketed.98
1. Experimental Medical Devices Under the MDA
The federal regulatory scheme governing medical devices includes
experimental medical devices. 99 Intraocular lenses, like the one at
issue in Slater, are classified as "investigational devices"' 00 and are
thus subject to the Investigational Device Exemption, which ex-
empts them from the customary safety and efficacy requirements of
the MDA. 1 °1 Specifically, an investigational device does not have to
comply with the pre-market approval procedures under section 360e,
96. S. REP. No. 33, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 1-2 (1975), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1070,
1070-71. For a more detailed explanation of the FDA regulatory process, see Maedgen & McCall,
supra note 18, at 442.
97. Mary Beth Ramey, Medical Device Defects, TRIAL, May 1986, at 39, 41.
98. Id. at 40-41.
99. 21 U.S.C. § 321(h) (1988). This section provides:
The term "device" ... means . . . [that which is] intended to affect the structure or
any function of the body of man or other animals, and which does not achieve any of
its principal intended purposes through chemical action within or on the body of man
or other animals and which is not dependent upon being metabolized for the achieve-
ment of any of its principal intended purposes.
Id.; see also 21 U.S.C. § 360j(g) (1988) (discussing experimental devices).
100. 21 C.F.R. § 813.3 (1993). The regulations provide:
(a) "lntraocular lens" ... is, for purposes of this part, synonymous with "investiga-
tional device" . . . .
(b) "lnvestigational device" means a device that is used in an investigational study
involving human subjects, where the study is for the purpose of determining if the
device is safe or effective.
id.
101. 21 U.S.C. § 360j(g) (1988). This section provides:
(g) Exemption for devices for investigational use (I) It is the purpose of this subsec-
tion to encourage, to the extent consistent with the protection of the public health and
safety and with ethical standard, the discovery and development of useful devices in-
tended for human use and to that end to maintain optimum freedom for scientific
investigators in their pursuit of that purpose. (2)(A) The Secretary shall, within the
one hundred and twenty-day period beginning on May 28, 1976, by regulation pre-
scribe procedures and conditions under which devices intended for human use may
upon application be granted an exemption from the requirements of section 352, 360,
360d, 360e, 360f, 360i, or 379e of this title or subsection (e) or (f) of this section or
from any combination of such requirements to permit the investigational use of such
devices by experts qualified by scientific training and experience to investigate the
safety and effectiveness of such devices.
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the good manufacturing practice requirements described at section
360j(f), or the performance standards under section 360d. 102 In-
stead, intraocular lenses must comply with other rules established
by the FDA for investigational devices. 10 3
The rules governing investigational devices require, among other
things, the submission of an application to the FDA describing the
device and setting forth a plan for studying the device's use on
human subjects."0 4 After approval by the FDA, the clinical investi-
gation is monitored to assure that its continuation is justified.' The
stated purpose of the Investigational Device Exemption is to en-
courage innovation consistent with the protection of public health
and safety.'
To take part in an experimental project under the FDA's regula-
tions, a participant must consent to the procedure. 10 7 The FDA's
regulations provide general requirements for informed consent,108
under which a participant cannot be made to waive his legal rights
or to release the investigator, the sponsor, the institution, or its
agents from liability. 0 9
102. Id.; see also 21 U.S.C. §§ 360d, 360e, 360j(f) (1988) (codifying these respective
provisions).
103. 21 C.F.R. §§ 813.1-.170 (1992). Section 813.1(a) outlines the scope of the Investigational
Device Exemption for intraocular lenses:
(a) General. This part provides that intraocular lenses may be exempted from any of
the requirements of the act enumerated in paragraph (b) of this section that would
otherwise be applicable to the device, to permit investigational studies of the device by
experts who are qualified by scientific training and experience to investigate the safety
and effectiveness of the lenses.
Id. § 813.1(a).
104. Id. §§ 813.20-.39.
105. Id. § 813.66(a)(5).
106. Id.; see also H.R. REP. No. 853, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 12 (1976), which provides:
The Committee recognizes the necessity to encourage the discovery and development
of medical devices intended for human use and the need for scientific investigators to
maintain freedom to do so. On the other hand, research on medical devices in the
developmental stage must not endanger the public health and must assure the highest
ethical standards ....
Id. at 42.
107. 21 C.F.R. § 50.20 (1993).
108. The regulations provide that:
No informed consent, whether oral or written, may include any exculpatory language
through which the subject or the representative is made to waive or appear to waive
any of the subject's legal rights, or releases or appear to release the investigator, the




a. The "Preemption" Provision of the MDA
As part of the MDA, Congress enacted a preemption provision
which provides:
Except as provided in subsection (b), no State or political subdivision of a
State may establish or continue in effect with respect to a device intended
for human use any requirement - (1) which is different from, or in addi-
tion to, any requirement applicable under this Act to the device, and (2)
which relates to the safety or effectiveness of the device or to any other
matter included in a requirement applicable to a device under this
chapter." 0
Thus, a state is prohibited from adopting any requirement that con-
flicts with a stated provision of the MDA. A state may, however,
request an exemption from the preemption provision if its regula-
tions are "more stringent" than the federal requirements or if its
regulations are "required by compelling local conditions."'11
As in other contexts, two types of preemption may occur under
the MDA: express and implied preemption." 2 For express preemp-
tion to occur under the MDA, a two-pronged test must be satis-
fied."1 ' First, it must be determined whether the state requirement
in question relates to a matter included in the federal regulations." 4
If it does, then it must be determined whether the state law require-
ment is different from or in addition to the specific requirement
found in the federal regulations." 5 Express preemption under the
MDA, then, is limited to situations where specific counterpart regu-
lations exist."' Where the two-pronged test is not satisfied, it must
110. 21 U.S.C. § 360k (1988).
I11. Id. § 360k(b). The exemption requirements codified in this section provide:
Upon application of a State or political subdivision thereof, the Secretary may, by
regulation promulgated after notice and opportunity for an oral hearing, exempt from
[preemption] . . .a requirement of such State or political subdivision applicable to a
device intended for human use if- (1) the requirement is more stringent than [the
federal requirement] . . .or (2) the requirement - (A) is required by compelling
local conditions, and (B) compliance with the requirement would not cause the device
to be in violation of any applicable requirement under this chapter.
Id.
112. See supra note 29-31 and accompanying text (describing the two different types of federal
preemption).
113. Smith v. Pingree, 651 F.2d. 1021, 1023 (5th Cir. 1981).
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. The regulations provide: "State or local requirements are preempted only when the Food
and Drug Administration has established specific counterpart regulations or there are other spe-
cific requirements applicable to a particular device under the act .... " 21 C.F.R. § 808.1(d)
(1993): see also 43 Fed. Reg. 18,661 (May 2, 1978), in which the FDA explains:
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then be considered whether the state requirement is impliedly pre-
empted. As in other contexts, legislative intent is a key factor in
ascertaining whether implied preemption exists. 117
b. The Legislative History of the MDA
Two general purposes have been advanced as reasons for the en-
actment of the MDA. One goal was to ensure that Americans are
not put at risk from using unsafe or ineffective medical devices. 1 8
The MDA was also intended to prevent the undue burden on inter-
state commerce caused by varying state requirements for medical
devices."'
i. Health and Safety
The report of the Senate Committee on Labor and Pubic Welfare
indicates that the medical device legislation was prompted by the
Dalkon Shield litigation.120 The Report explains that the Health
Subcommittee believed that medical device legislation was urgently
needed because of the health hazards posed by unregulated in-
trauterine devices ("IUDs"). 2' The witnesses before the Health
Subcommittee urged that the deaths and illnesses caused by the
Dalkon Shield could have been prevented had medical device legis-
lation been in place at the time IUDs were developed.' 22 As a result,
Thus, from a plain reading of section 521 of the act it is clear that the scope of
preemption is limited to instances where there are specific FDA requirements applica-
ble to a particular device or class of devices. . . [A] prime example is the preemption
of divergent State or local requirements relating to hearing aid labeling . .. , which
occurred when the new FDA hearing aid regulations took effect. . . . [Only require-
ments relating to labeling and conditions for sale were preempted, not all State or
local requirements regulating other facets of hearing-aid distribution.
Id. at 18,662.
117. See supra notes 42-45 and accompanying text (discussing the role of congressional intent
in determining the existence of implied preemption).
118. S. REP. No. 33, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1975), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1070,
1071; H.R. REP. No. 853, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 12 (1976), 121 CONG. REC. 10,688 (April 17,
1975) (statement of Sen. Kennedy).
119. HR. REP,. No. 853, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. , at 12, 45 (1976).
120. S. REP. No. 33, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 1-2 (1975), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1070,
1070-71.
121. Id.
122. One witness noted:
Today the Food and Drug Administration only has limited authority to act with re-
spect to a medical device in the market place which has been proven dangerous and
patients have been injured. Medical device legislation is intended to assure that medi-
cal devices such as these IUD's meet the requirements of safety and effectiveness
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consumer health and safety seem to have been the primary concerns
in introducing the Amendments. As Senator Ted Kennedy, the bill's
sponsor, stated: "The legislation [was] written so that the benefit of
the doubt is always given to the consumer. After all it is the con-
sumer who pays with his health and his life for medical device
malfunctions. '2 3
ii. Protection of Interstate Commerce
The legislative history of the Amendments also shows that Con-
gress was concerned with the issue of interstate commerce, as the
House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce debated the
effects that differing state regulations would have on such com-
merce.' The House Report indicates "[t]he Committee recog-
nize[d] that if a substantial number of differing requirements appli-
cable to a medical device [were] imposed by jurisdictions other than
the federal government, interstate commerce would be unduly
burdened."12
One of the drafts of the medical device legislation spoke directly
to the issue of interstate commerce. That draft contained a provision
which mandated that in order to avoid preemption, a more stringent
state requirement1 26 must not interfere with interstate commerce.' 27
before they are put in widespread use throughout the United States.
Id. at 2 (statement of Sen. Kennedy).
123. 121 CONG. REC. 10,688 (April 17, 1975) (statement of Sen. Kennedy).
124. H.R REP. No. 853, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 12, 45 (1976); see also S. REP. No. 33, 94th
Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1975), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1070, 1107 (stating that one of the
purposes for the MDA's enactment was to prevent an undue burden on interstate commerce
through the proliferation of varying state regulations.).
125. H.R. REP. No. 853, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 45 (1976). The Committee stated that because
differing requirements may affect interstate commerce:
[Tihe reported bill contains special provisions governing regulation of devices by
states and localities. First, the reported bill prescribes a general rule that no state or
political subdivision thereof may establish or continue in effect any requirement with
respect to a device for human use which is different from, or in addition to, any
requirement made applicable to such a device under the proposed legislation or ex-
isting provisions.
Id.
126. See supra note Ill and accompanying text (describing how states can supplement the
federal regulations with more stringent requirements).
127. H.R. 5545, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 75 (1975). The bill provided that:
(2) Upon application of a State or a political subdivision thereof, the Secretary may,
by regulation promulgated after notice and opportunity for an oral hearing, exempt
from subsection (a), under such conditions as may be prescribed in such regulation, a
requirement of such State or political subdivision applicable to a device intended for
human use if - (A) the requirement is required by compelling local conditions, (B)
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The legislation that was ultimately passed, however, did not contain
any requirements compelling a state to show the absence of a bur-
den on interstate commerce, although nothing in the MDA's legisla-
tive history refers to the reason for this deletion.
2. Preemption Cases Under the Investigational Device Exemption
For Intraocular Lenses
To date, only two preemption cases have specifically construed the
investigational intraocular lens provision of the MDA. 28 Other than
Slater, the only preemption case dealing with the intraocular lens
provision of the MDA is Mitchell v. IOLAB Corp.,'29 which has a
fact pattern very similar to that of Slater.
In Mitchell, the plaintiff sued the manufacturer of his intraocular
lens implant, alleging that he suffered injuries as a result of a defect
in the lens.13 The defendant, IOLAB, filed a motion for summary
judgment claiming that Mitchell's state law claims were preempted
by the MDA, and particularly by the federal regulations governing
intraocular lenses.' 3 1 Focusing on the consent provision in the fed-
eral regulations, the Mitchell court declined to hold that state com-
mon law claims were preempted.3 2 The court reasoned that the fed-
eral regulations clearly provide that informed consent is required;' 33
thus, a consent form cannot include any exculpatory language
through which test subjects are forced to waive or release their legal
rights.'34 The court noted that the informed consent provision is in-
corporated by reference in the regulations exempting investigational
devices.' 35 Therefore, the court held that Mitchell's legal rights were
preserved since they were not "different from, or in addition to, any
requirement applicable under this Act . . .which relates to the
the requirement does not unduly burden interstate commerce, and (C) compliance
with the requirement would not cause the device to be in violation of an applicable
requirement under this Act.
Id.
128. Slater v, Optical Radiation Corp., 961 F.2d 1330 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 327
(1992); Mitchell v. IOLAB Corp., 700 F. Supp. 877 (E.D. La. 1988).
129. 700 F. Supp. 877 (E.D. La. 1988).
130. Id. at 877-78.




135. Id. at 879; see supra notes 99-109 and accompanying text (discussing experimental medi-
cal devices and their exempt status).
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"1136safety and effectiveness of the device ....
Although there have been other suits against intraocular lens
manufacturers, these cases have been settled and therefore have not
resulted in the development of any substantive law on the issue of
preemption under the intraocular lens provision of the MDA. None-
theless, the existence of these cases suggests that manufacturers are
being held accountable for the injuries caused by their defective
products. For example, in Donnely v. Copeland Intra Lenses, Inc., 37
the plaintiff filed a suit against a lens manufacturer claiming that
the defendant's lens had caused an infection that led to the loss of
sight in her left eye and the loss of muscle control in part of her
face. 138 The suit was ultimately settled for $50,000.139
C. Policy Reasons For and Against Holding Manufacturers
Liable for Product Defects in the Experimental Medical Device
Context
While some policy reasons support holding manufacturers liable
for defects in their products, there are other arguments which op-
pose the imposition of liability in the experimental medical device
context. 4 o
1. Policy Reasons for Imposing Liability
There are two major policy reasons for imposing liability on man-
ufacturers of defective products. First, liability provides an incentive
for manufacturers to produce safer products. Second, holding manu-
facturers liable spreads the loss caused by defective products among
all of those who benefit from such products.
136. Mitchell, 700 F. Supp. at 879.
137. 87 F.R.D. 80 (E.D.N.Y. 1980).
138. Id. at 82.
139. Id. The United States District Court for the District of Minnesota entered a default judg-
ment against Torrigan Laboratories, Inc., a third-party defendant who had sterilized and pack-
aged the lens. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York, however,
held that the Minnesota judgment was void because the court never acquired personal jurisdiction
over Torrigan Laboratories. Id. at 85-86; see also Kennedy v. IOLAB Corp., No. 51261 (Ohio Ct.
App. Nov. 6, 1986) (dismissing a suit against an intraocular lens manufacturer without
prejudice).
140. Even though liability claims relating to experimental medical devices may present some
practical problems on the merits, that subject is beyond the scope of this Note because if preemp-
tion occurs, the merits of the case are never reached.
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a. Promotion of Product Safety
One reason for holding manufacturers liable for product defects is
that the imposition of liability promotes product safety. 4 1 Many
courts subscribe to this product safety theory of liability.14 2 Since a
manufacturer's goal is to maximize profits, there is less incentive to
spend the extra time and money to make a product safer if the man-
ufacturer will not be held liable for product-related injuries. " 3 By
holding manufacturers liable, the courts force manufacturers to
choose between making their products safer and compensating in-
jured plaintiffs. 144
141. Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 150 P.2d 436, 440-41 (Cal. 1944) (Traynor, J., concur-
ring) ("[Plublic policy demands that responsibility be fixed wherever it will most effectively re-
duce the hazards to life and health inherent in defective products that reach the market. It is
evident that the manufacturer can anticipate some hazards and guard against the occurrence of
others, as the public cannot."). See David G. Owen, Rethinking the Policies of Strict Product
Liability. 33 VAND. L. REV, 681, 684 (1980) (arguing that since manufacturers advertise their
products to the public and thereby cause consumers to rely on their safety, manufacturers must
bear the burden of safety); Rosemary Kelley, Comment, Prescription Drugs and Strict Liability:
The Flaw in the Ointment, 19 PAC. L.J. 193, 198 (1987) (stating that strict liability creates an
incentive for manufacturers to make safer products).
142. See, e.g., Lewis v. Timco, Inc., 716 F.2d 1425, 1429 (5th Cir. 1983) (stating that manu-
facturer liability encourages the production of safe products); Salt River Project Agric. Improve-
ment & Power Dist. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 694 P.2d 198, 205-06 (Ariz. 1984) ("When
• ..defendants realize that they may be held liable, there is of course a strong incentive to pre-
vent the occurrence of the harm. Not infrequently one reason for imposing liability is the deliber-
ate purpose of providing that incentive . . . .[Tihe manufacturer who is made liable to the con-
sumer for defects in a product will do what can be done to see that there are no such defects.")
(quoting WILLIAM L, PROSSER & W. PAGE KEETON. THE LAW OF TORTS § 4, at 25-26) (5th ed.
1984)); Daly v. General Motors Corp., 575 P.2d 1162, 1169 (Cal. 1978) (reasoning that strict
liability gives manufacturers an "incentive to produce safe products, ...to avoid and correct
product defects . . .[, and an] incentive toward safety both in design and production"); Palmer v.
A.H. Robbins Co., Inc., 684 P.2d 187, 218 (Colo. 1984) (stating that the principles of modern
product liability law evolved in part to motivate manufacturers to combat the massive problem of
product accidents); Star Furniture Co. v. Pulaski Furniture Co., 297 S.E.2d 854, 860-61 (W.Va.
1982) (allowing a claim based on product liability because "strict liability places an obligation on
manufacturers ...to market safe products").
143. See Thomas A. Cowan, Some Policy Bases of Product Liability, 17 STAN. L. REV. 1077,
1090-92 (1965) (describing the increase in a manufacturer's risk as it correlates to the decrease in
a consumer's risk).
144. This rationale presupposes that manufacturers will only increase product safety where it is
cost-effective to do so. See William R. Hadley, Comment, Strict Liability - The Medical Mal-
practice Citadel Still Stands, II CREIGHTON L. REV. 1357, 1360 (1978) (discussing a manufac-
turer's choice between making a product safer or compensating injured consumers); John Riper,
Note, Strict Liability in Hybrid Cases, 32 STAN. L. REV. 391, 394 (1980) (criticizing the product
safety rationale of product liability law). Thus, when it is cheaper to pay tort judgments than it is
to improve the safety of a product, a manufacturer will be inclined to choose the former course of
action.
EXPERIMENTAL MEDICAL DEVICES
b. Spreading the Loss
Another public policy reason for holding manufacturers liable for
defects in their products involves the spreading of losses. 45 Loss-
spreading allows a victim to deflect the costs of her injuries onto
those individuals who benefit from the product: the consuming pub-
lic. Loss-spreading is justified in part by the fact that future con-
sumers benefit from information gathered during the period prior to
their own use of the product.' 46 Placing the loss on the product
seller through manufacturer liability is the easiest way in which the
cost of product losses can be shifted to the consuming public, since
the manufacturer can include the cost of the loss in the price of the
product.47
2. Policy Reasons Against Imposing Liability
There are also some public policy reasons that cut against holding
manufacturers liable for defective products in the experimental
medical device context. First, holding manufacturers liable may dis-
courage manufacturers from developing new products.148 Second,
145. See generally William C. Powers, Jr., Distinguishing Between Products and Services in
Strict Liability, 62 N.C. L. REV. 415, 423-28 (1984) (noting that a common rationale for strict
product liability is that it internalizes accident costs by incorporating them into the price of the
product, thus spreading a victim's loss among an entire group of consumers).
146. See George C. Pratt & Fred W. Parnon, Diagnosis of a Legal Headache: Liability for
Unforeseeable Defects in Drugs, 53 ST. JoIN's L. REV. 517, 538 (1979) (discussing the possibility
that manufacturers will use the first injured parties as "guinea pigs").
147. As Judge Roger Traynor stated in his concurring opinion in Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling
Co.: "The cost of an injury and the loss of time or health may be an overwhelming misfortune to
the person injured, and a needless one, for the risk of injury can be insured by the manufacturer
and distributed among the public as a cost of doing business." Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co.,
150 P.2d 436, 441 (Cal. 1944) (Traynor, J., concurring); see also Becker v. IRM Corp., 698 P.2d
116, 123 (Cal. 1985) (declaring that the paramount policy of the strict liability rule remains
spreading the cost of compensating otherwise defenseless victims of manufacturing defects
throughout society); Immergluck v. Ridgeview House, Inc., 368 N.E.2d 803, 804 (iI1. App. Ct.
1977) ("It is also widely held that another policy consideration to be considered is that the com-
mercial enterprise distributing the product is in the best position to distribute the risk of injury
proximately caused by a defective condition of its product, by passing the loss on to the public as
an additional cost of doing business."); Berry v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 717 P.2d 670, 673 (Utah
1985) (stating that the doctrine of product liability was premised on the proposition that the cost
of injuries caused by defective products which are sold for a profit should be considered a cost of
doing business to be borne by manufacturers, through insurance if necessary, rather than by in-
jured individuals who could not have effectively protected themselves through insurance or other
means); Fleming James, General Products - Should Manufacturers Be Liable Without Negli-
gence?, 24 TENN. L. REV. 923, 924 (1957) (arguing that "it is both just and expedient that the
enterprise which causes losses should lift them from the individual victims and distribute them
widely among those who benefit from the activities of the enterprise").
148. See, e.g., Pennington P. Landen, Federal Preemption and the Drug Industry: Can Courts
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holding manufacturers liable forces both the states and the courts to
second-guess the FDA.14
a. Discouraging Innovation
Allowing state tort claims against manufacturers may in fact chill
a manufacturer's desire to produce new products because of poten-
tial liability costs. 150 This argument has been forcefully advanced in
the context of drug manufacturer liability. 151 As one scholar writes:
Drug manufacturers on the whole produce valuable, sometimes life-saving
products. The specter of liability . . . chills the manufacturer's incentive to
develop new products, making it prefer instead the tried and true remedies
which appear safer from a liability standpoint. Because it is the nature of
medical science to advance and progress, a pharmaceutical industry that
lags woefully behind scientific advances prevents the public from partaking
in new remedies for illness.' 52
In addition, tort liability may even force manufacturers to take ex-
isting products off the market. 53 It is the public then that suffers
from the current liability system, because "[w]hen it is not cost-
benefit effective to produce approved drugs or develop new drugs,
the public pays the price in unnecessary and unrelieved
suffering." 54
b. Improper Second-Guessing of the FDA
Another policy reason opposing manufacturer liability in the med-
ical device context is that states and courts should not second-guess
the FDA. The FDA is considered to be the governing body in medi-
cal device regulation; under the MDA, medical devices must comply
with FDA standards and receive approval before they can be mar-
Co-Regulate?, 43 FOOD DRUG COsM. L.J. 85, 118 (1988) (noting that "[tihe spectre of liability
- despite FDA approval - chills the manufacturer's incentive to develop new products").
149. See Charles J. Walsh & Marc S. Klein, The Conflicting Objectives of Federal and State
Tort Law Drug Regulation, 41 FOOD DRUG CosM. L.J. 171, 193 (1986) ("In view of the compre-
hensiveness and rigor of the federal scheme, courts should defer to the specific scientific and policy
judgments made by the FDA.").
150. Landen, supra note 148, at 118.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 118-19.
153. Id. at 119.
154. ld.; see also PETER W. HUBER, LIABILITY: THE LEGAL REVOLUTION AND ITS CONSE-
QUENCES 4 (1988) (discussing how America's tort system costs manufacturers more than $80
billion a year in direct payments and insurance costs and thus has prevented new and possibly
safer products from entering the marketplace).
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keted.' 5 Holding a manufacturer liable after it has complied with
FDA standards effectively second-guesses the FDA's judgment. Be-
cause the FDA is considered to be the expert in the medical device
context, states and courts should defer to the FDA's judgment. 15 6
While the policy reasons for holding manufacturers liable for de-
fects in their products are consistent with the preservation of statue
tort claims in the face of preemption, there are some arguments that
cut against holding manufacturers liable in the experimental medi-
cal device context. Despite the policy rationales for preserving tort
claims, the Seventh Circuit in Slater held that common law tort
claims are preempted by the Medical Device Amendments. 57
II. SUBJECT OPINION - SLATER V. OPTICAL RADIATION CORP.
A. Facts and Procedural History
On July 19, 1984, Albert Slater was admitted to Hinsdale Hospi-
tal to have a cataract removed from his left eye.' Cataract re-
moval procedures destroy the eye's natural lens, 59 so rather than
face potential blindness, Mr. Slater chose to undergo an experimen-
tal procedure in which his natural lens was replaced with an in-
traocular lens implant. 60 Mr. Slater used the Stableflex Model
#UV- 11-H lens implant manufactured by ORC.'61 The implant was
inserted into Mr. Slater's eye as part of a clinical investigation con-
155. See supra notes 94-98 and accompanying text (discussing the purpose of the MDA).
156. See Walsh & Klein, supra note 149, at 193 (arguing that "[i]n view of the comprehen-
siveness and rigor of the federal scheme, courts should defer to the specific scientific and policy
judgments made by the FDA"). Moreover, others argue that courts and juries are incapable of
making the determinations that are generally left to the FDA. See Premo Pharmaceutical Labs.,
Inc. v. United States, 629 F.2d 795, 804 (2d Cir. 1980) (opining that the FDA, by reason of its
expertise, is usually better-equipped to make such a determination than the courts); United States
v. 1,048,000 Capsules, 494 F.2d 1158, 1160 (5th Cir. 1974) (stating that under the Food, Drug,
and Cosmetic Act, the ultimate determination of the safety of a drug is not a matter given to the
courts, but one to be determined by the FDA); United States v. Articles of Drug, 498 F. Supp.
424, 431 (D.N.J. 1980) (holding that "[a] district court is not empowered to evaluate the actual
safety and effectiveness of a drug product" and that the "determination is committed to the FDA
due to its superior access to technical expertise"). But see Graham v. Wyeth Labs., 666 F. Supp.
1483, 1499 (D. Kan. 1987) (rejecting the defendant's argument that it would be improper for a
lay jury to decide issues delegated to the expertise of a federal agency), later proceeding, 906 F.2d
1399 (10th Cir.), later proceeding, 906 F.2d 1419 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S 981 (1990).
157. Slater v. Optical Radiation Corp., 961 F.2d 1330, 1334 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct.
327 (1992).
158. Id. at 1332.
159. See supra notes 1-2 and accompanying text (noting the effects of cataract removal).
160. Slater, 961 F.2d at 1332.
161. Id.
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ducted pursuant to the Medical Device Amendments to the Federal
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938 ("FDCA") 6 2 and the regu-
lations pertaining to intraocular lenses.' 6 3 Prior to the implantation
of the lens, Mr. Slater signed a consent form indicating that he rec-
ognized that he was taking part in a clinical investigation
program. 64
Over the next several years, the vision in Mr. Slater's left eye
deteriorated, leaving him in continuous pain. 6 5 On January 8, 1986,
Mr. Slater was diagnosed with cystoidmacular edema,' 66 and his
doctors recommended that his intraocular lens implant be re-
moved. 67 Subsequent removal of the lens left Mr. Slater with per-
manent damage to his left eye, damage greater than what he would
have suffered had he not had the implant. 6 '
The doctor performing the lens removal noticed that the lens was
difficult to remove because of its awkward design.'6 9 Based on his
findings, the doctor wrote a letter to the FDA urging that the
Stableflex Model #UV-I I-H lens be removed from the market; 170
ORC acquiesced and subsequently halted manufacture of its lens.' 7'
Mr. Slater then brought a cause of action against ORC, the manu-
facturer of the intraocular lens, seeking recovery under Illinois law
in negligence, strict liability, breach of implied warranty, and willful
and wanton misconduct. 172 All of Mr. Slater's claims were essen-
tially based on the safety and effectiveness of the lens.' 73 The dis-
trict court granted summary judgment for ORC.174 Mr. Slater ap-
pealed the decision,'175 but the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district
court's finding that preemption existed. 76
162. 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-93 (1988).
163. 21 C.F.R. §§ 813.1-.170 (1992).
164. Slater, 961 F.2d at 1332.
165. Id.
166. See supra note 8 and accompanying text (defining cystoid macular edema).
167. Slater, 961 F.2d at 1332.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Appellant's Brief at 4, Slater (No. 91-1544).
171. APPLE ET AL.. supra note 2, at 88.
172. Slater v. Optical Radiation Corp., 756 F. Supp. 370, 371 (N.D. Ill. 1991), ajfd, 961 F.2d
1330 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 327 (1992).
173. Slater, 756 F.Supp at 373.
174. Id. at 374,
175. Slater v. Optical Radiation Corp., 961 F.2d 1330 (7th Cir.), cert. denied. 113 S. Ct. 327
(1992).
176. Slater. 961 F.2d at 1334.
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B. The District Court's Reasoning
In holding that Mr. Slater's claims were expressly preempted by
the MDA, the district court specifically analyzed the preemption
provision of the Amendments. 1 7 As the court noted, the MDA only
preempts "any state tort standard which would impose requirements
on producers of medical devices which are different from or in addi-
tion to the specific counterpart regulations or other specific require-
ments promulgated by the FDA." 178
Searching for such specific "counterpart regulations," the court
focused on the Investigational Device Exemption for intraocular
lenses.1 79 The Investigational Device Exemption sets forth the proce-
dures and conditions under which intraocular lens manufacturers,
during the investigational stage, may be granted an exemption from
the otherwise required safety and effectiveness provisions for medi-
cal devices.' 80 The district court believed that this exemption consti-
tuted the necessary specific counterpart requirement and thus held
that all of the plaintiff's claims were preempted."8 ' Without clearly
articulating its reasoning, the court stated that "[tihe imposition of
state tort requirements in this case would clearly be 'different from,
or in addition to' both the terms of the [Food, Drug, and Cosmetic
Act] and the requirements of the [Investigational Device Exemp-
tion] promulgated by the FDA for safety and effectiveness." 182
C. The Seventh Circuit's Reasoning
In affirming the district court's holding, the Seventh Circuit
agreed that Mr. Slater's claims were preempted by the Medical De-
vice Amendments.' 3 Speaking for the Seventh Circuit, Judge Rich-
ard Posner characterized Mr. Slater's "real gripe" as a defective
177. Slater v. Optical Radiation Corp., 756 F. Supp. 370, 372 (N.D. Ill. 1991), aff'd, 961 F.2d
1330 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 327 (1992).
178. Slater, 756 F. Supp. at 372.
179. Id.
180. Id., see also supra notes 99-109 and accounting text (discussing the terms and scope of
the Investigational Device Exemption).
181. Slater, 756 F. Supp. at 372.
182. Id. Evidently the court believed that the imposition of state tort claims would require the
defendant manufacturer to do more with respect to the "safety and effectiveness" of the lens than
was required under the Investigational Device Exemption, since manufacturers are exempt from
the safety and effectiveness requirements under the regulations.
183. Slater v. Optical Radiation Corp., 961 F.2d 1330, 1334 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct.
327 (1992).
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design claim,' 84 summing up the plaintiff's design defect theory as a
claim that since the exemption regulations do not specify a design
for investigational devices, there are no specific federal counterpart
regulations based on design which trigger the preemption
provision.' 86
After considering the Investigational Device Exemption, the Sev-
enth Circuit agreed that the regulations do not impose any require-
ments concerning the design of intraocular lenses.' 86 However, the
court stated that the plaintiff's argument assumed that the only way
to avoid preemption would be to actually specify the design.187
Judge Posner found this to be a "cramped" interpretation of the
preemption provision, 88 and cautioned that allowing such an inter-
pretation would "cripple the exemption for investigational devices"
altogether. 89 The court stated that since the devices are experimen-
tal during the time in which the exemption is in effect, the FDA can
hardly be expected to specify a safe and effective design.'90
The court further stated that the regulations at the experimental
stage are procedural as opposed to substantive.1" ' Rather than speci-
fying an actual safe and effective design, the regulations specify pro-
cedures for determining whether a device is safe and effective.' 2
The appellate court stated that procedural requirements pertaining
to safety and effectiveness can and do have a preemptive effect over
any state requirements relating to safety and effectiveness. 93 Al-
lowing a state common law recovery would essentially require the
manufacturer to take actions greater than or different from those
required by the FDA regulations; namely, they would be required to
have different design characteristics. " The court stated that "this






190. Id. The court further stated: "If there were a known safe and effective design, the device




193. Id. The court stated that although an investigational exemption "is different from a certifi-
cation that the design of the device is safe and effective, it is a certification that the design is
sufficiently safe and effective to allow experimental use on human beings" and therefore is a safety




engrafting of additional requirements relating to safety or effective-
ness is forbidden by the preemption provision in the Medical De-
vices Amendments."' 195
The Seventh Circuit did acknowledge that the district court had
disagreed with Mitchell,198 the only other case concerning the pre-
emptive force of the exemption provision for investigational de-
vices. 197 The court then proceeded to criticize the Mitchell decision,
stating that Mitchell effectively repealed the preemption provision
by allowing the plaintiff's claims based on safety and effective-
ness. "'98 According to the Seventh Circuit, only claims not based on
the safety and effectiveness of the lens are preserved by the consent
provision in the federal regulations governing intraocular lenses.1 99
III. ANALYSIS
Determining whether preemption exists and exactly what is pre-
empted is not an easy task. Perhaps that is why the Seventh Circuit
failed when it reached its decision in Slater. First, the Seventh Cir-
cuit erroneously held that Mr. Slater's claims were expressly pre-
empted. Although it was questionable whether express preemption
existed in this case, the Seventh Circuit also failed to consider
whether Mr. Slater's claims were impliedly preempted. Third, the
court gave no attention to the distinction between state regulation
and state common law tort actions. Finally, the court failed because
the result in Slater is inconsistent with policy reasons favoring the
imposition of liability on manufacturers for defects in their
products.
A. The Seventh Circuit Erroneously Found Express Preemption
In Slater, the Seventh Circuit held that the preemption provision
of the MDA expressly preempts product liability claims against in-
traocular lens manufacturers."' This finding is erroneous for three
reasons. First, the broad preemption provision of the MDA is not
specific enough to trigger express preemption. Second, allowing
claims similar to those of Mr. Slater would not impose requirements
195. Id.
196. See supra notes 129-36 and accompanying text (discussing the Mitchell case).
197. Slater, 961 F.2d at 1331.
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different from or in addition to a provision found in the federal stat-
ute. Third, under a finding of express preemption, it is not possible
to reconcile the reasoning of Slater with that of Mitchell.
1. The Language of the MDA Preemption Provision is Not
Specific
For express preemption to occur, Congress must explicitly declare
that state law on a certain subject is preempted.20' The preemption
provision of the MDA does not explicitly state that experimental
medical device manufacturers will be immune from tort liability;20 2
indeed, the Investigational Device Exemption for intraocular lenses
does not contain any preemption language at all. 203 As has been pre-
viously mentioned, however, specific preemption language is needed
for express preemption to occur.
One example of the necessary express preemption language is
found in the Cigarette Act,20" which expressly provides that states
may not impose any advertising or labeling requirements that are
inconsistent with those required by the federal statute.20 5 But while
the language of the Cigarette Act is very specific as to what is pre-
empted, the preemption language in the MDA is quite different.20 6
The preemption provision of the MDA prohibits a state from impos-
ing any requirement on producers of medical devices which is differ-
ent from or in addition to any other regulation promulgated by the
FDA.2 7 This is a blanket approach to preemption which clearly
conflicts with the entire basis of the express preemption doctrine.
The essence of express preemption is that where Congress unam-
biguously states that preemption is to occur, there is no need to look
beyond the specific language at issue because the results of the pre-
emptive language are clear and unambiguous. In other words, be-
cause express preemption language is used, it is certain that Con-
201. See supra notes 32-41 and accompanying text (describing when express preemption
occurs).
202. See supra notes 110-11 and accompanying text (noting the language of the MDA's pre-
emption provision).
203. 21 C.F.R. §§ 813.1-.170 (1992).
204. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331-40 (1988).
205. This language was interpreted as expressly preempting further labeling requirements in
Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 112 S. Ct. 2608 (1992). See supra notes 35-39 and accompany-
ing text (discussing the Cipollone decision).
206. See supra notes I10-11 and accompanying text (noting the text of the preemption provi-
sion of the Medical Device Amendments).
207. 21 U.S.C. § 360k (1988).
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gress intended the exact results. With respect to the preemption
language used in the Cigarette Act, such is the case; by stating that
state labeling and warning requirements on cigarette packages are
preempted, Congress was apparently aware of the effects preemp-
tion would have. Such is not the case, however, with respect to the
preemption language of the MDA, as Congress did not consider the
effects of such a broad preemption provision.208 Thus, the broad pre-
emption language found in the Amendments is not the type of spe-
cific statement necessary for express preemption to occur.
2. A State Court Judgment Would Not Impose Requirements
Different From or in Addition to a Provision Found in the Federal
Statute
Assuming the broad preemption provision of the MDA applies,
allowing Mr. Slater's claim would not necessarily impose require-
ments different from or in addition to a provision found in the
MDA. Express preemption under the Amendments requires that a
two-pronged test be satisfied.20 9 First, it must be determined
whether the state requirement in question relates to a matter in-
cluded in the federal regulations.21 0 If so, it must then be deter-
mined whether the state law requirement is different from or in ad-
dition to the specific requirement found in the regulations. 1 In
other words, a court must determine whether the state requirement
conflicts with the federal requirement.
In Slater, the Seventh Circuit held that the Investigational De-
vice Exemption for intraocular lenses - specifically the exemption
from having to specify a safe and effective design before marketing
an experimental device - constitutes the specific counterpart regu-
lation necessary to invoke the preemption provision.21 2 While the
court was correct in holding that a state tort judgment based on the
safety and effectiveness of a device relates to the exemption provi-
sion, the court erred in summarily assuming that a state tort judg-
ment conflicts with the federal exemption. Simply requiring a manu-
208. Congress would have had to consider the effects of preemption with respect to each and
every regulation promulgated by the FDA.
209. Smith v. Pingree, 651 F.2d 1021, 1023 (5th Cir. 1981); see supra notes 113-17 and ac-
companying text (describing the two-pronged test).
210. Pingree, 651 F.2d at 1023.
211. Id.
212. Slater v. Optical Radiation Corp., 961 F.2d 1330, 1333 (7th Cir), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct.
327 (1992).
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facturer to pay a state tort judgment does not necessarily require
the manufacturer to do more than is required by the federal stat-
ute.213 Rather than specify a safe and effective design before mar-
keting an experimental product, the manufacturer could simply
treat a tort judgment as a cost of doing business and pass the cost
on to the consumer.214 Because the state regulation at issue in
Slater did not conflict with a requirement found in the federal stat-
ute, express preemption did not occur.
3. Express Preemption Prevents Reconciliation of Slater and
Mitchell
Under a finding of express preemption, it is not possible to recon-
cile the reasoning of Slater with that of Mitchell, the only other
case directly on point. The two decisions clash over the actual mean-
ing and scope of the consent provision in the federal statute.215 The
consent provision concerns the type of informed consent that must
be given to patients who take part in investigational device pro-
grams;21 6 the provision clearly states that patients cannot be made
to waive any legal claims, including those against the
manufacturer." 7
The Mitchell court held that the consent provision clearly pre-
serves a patient's legal rights, even against the manufacturer.21
That court stated that since the consent provision is incorporated by
reference into the regulations governing intraocular lenses, state law
claims are not preempted.219 On the other hand, the court in Slater
found that the consent provision merely preserves the plaintiff's
common law rights outside of the preemption provision.220
While both courts acknowledged the validity of the informed con-
213. A state tort judgment is akin to neither a state regulation nor an injunction that clearly
prohibits a manufacturer from selling a product until it proves that it is safe and effective, and
thus does not require more than is required under the federal statute.
214. This approach furthers the risk-spreading policy for imposing liability on manufacturers
for product defects. See supra notes 145-47 and accompanying text (discussing the policy of loss-
spreading).
215. 21 C.F.R. § 50.20 (1992); see supra note 108 (providing the text of the consent
provision).
216. 21 C.F.R. § 50.20 (1992).
217. Id.
218. Mitchell v. IOLAB Corp., 700 F. Supp. 877, 879 (E.D. La. 1988).
219. Id.




sent provision, they differed as to the meaning and effect the provi-
sion is to have. Under Slater a patient's legal rights against the
manufacturer, which are supposedly preserved under the MDA's
consent provision, were stripped away. Since the federal statute does
not state that the consent provision is limited by other provisions of
the MDA, it should not be given the limited effect that the Slater
court gave it; the decision in Slater effectively repealed the consent
provision. The MDA's consent provision, which preserves a patient's
legal rights against a manufacturer, directly conflicts with the
Slater court's finding of express preemption.
B. The Seventh Circuit's Failure to Consider Implied
Preemption
Because it is questionable whether Mr. Slater's state tort claims
were expressly preempted by the MDA, the Seventh Circuit should
have considered whether those claims were impliedly preempted. If
the court had considered implied preemption, it would have con-
cluded that state common law claims were not preempted.
Implied preemption analysis starts with the premise that there is
a strong presumption against preemption, particularly where the
state law deals with areas that have been traditionally occupied by
the states, such as the local regulation of matters related to health
and safety.221 Implied preemption occurs when federal regulations
are so comprehensive that state law is displaced, when there is a
dominant federal interest in the subject matter, or when there is a
direct conflict between the federal and state laws at issue. 22 Con-
gressional intent must be considered in determining whether any of
these tests are satisfied.223
I. Comprehensive Federal Regulations
Where Congress comprehensively deals with a subject, implied
preemption occurs.224 Implied preemption under such circumstances
221. See supra notes 71-73 and accompanying text (noting the presumptions courts make in
determining if implied preemption exists).
222. See supra notes 42-73 and accompanying text (discussing the three types of implied
preemption).
223. See supra note 45 and accompanying text (noting that congressional intent is part of the
determination of implied preemption).
224. See supra note 46-50 and accompanying text (discussing how comprehensive federal regu-
lations displace state law).
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is based on the assumption that because Congress left no room for
state regulation, Congress intended to preempt state law.
Notwithstanding the extensive nature of the federal system gov-
erning medical devices, the legislation is not exclusive enough to
warrant a finding of implied preemption. The legislative history of
the MDA reveals that Congress knew that the FDA would not be
able to eliminate all injuries arising from medical devices, and thus
the FDA was not intended to be the only source of regulation on the
subject.22 5 To this end, the MDA provides a mechanism whereby a
state may supplement the federal regulations, provided that the
state's regulations are "more stringent" than the federal regulations
or are "required by compelling local conditions. 226
Because the medical device legislation permits the states to play a
supplementary role in the context of medical device regulation, it
cannot be assumed that Congress intentionally proscribed state reg-
ulation of this area. Thus, a finding of implied preemption on this
basis must fail.
2. Dominant Federal Interest
An act of Congress in a field in which the federal government has
a dominant interest will be assumed to preclude enforcement of
state laws on the same subject.227 For implied preemption to occur
based on the federal government's dominant interest, that interest
must indeed be superior to the state's interest. The Supreme Court
has held that the federal government holds such a requisite interest
225. See H.R. REP. No. 853, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., 15-16 (1976), which provides in pertinent
part:
Contained in various provisions throughout the proposed legislation is the requirement
that regulatory action be taken to provide reasonable assurance of the safety and
effectiveness of medical devices. This requirement is predicated upon the recognition
that no regulatory mechanism can guarantee that a product will never cause injury, or
will always produce effective results. Rather, the objective of the legislation is to es-
tablish a mechanism in which the public is afforded reasonable assurance that medi-
cal devices are safe and effective.
Id. Congress apparently intended this legislation to be only a reasonable assurance that medical
devices were safe and effective, because Congress knew that the FDA would not be able to elimi-
nate all injuries resulting from medical devices. Clearly, the FDA was not intended to be the only
source of regulation on the subject.
226. See supra note I ll and accompanying text (citing the Medical Device Amendments' ex-
ception provisions).
227. See supra note 51-57 and accompanying text (discussing the dominant federal interest
basis for implied preemption).
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in issues involving foreign affairs and national security. 28 The same
can hardly be said about the subject matter governed by the
Amendments. Although the federal government does have an inter-
est in protecting the health and safety of the nation's citizens, its
interest is not superior to that of the states in this area.
Historically, the states have governed the ordinary affairs of peo-
ple's lives; 229 consequently, issues relating to health and safety have
traditionally been preserved for the states.230 Deference to the states
on this issue is actually reflected in the MDA; the fact that the fed-
eral regulatory scheme allows the states to supplement the federal
regulations relating to medical devices evidences the fact that Con-
gress recognized the overlapping federal and state interests involved
in the health and safety area. Because the federal government does
not have a dominant federal interest in the health and safety arena,
implied preemption on this basis cannot succeed.
3. Direct Conflict Between State and Federal Law
State law is also impliedly preempted when it directly conflicts
with federal law on the same subject. 231 Direct conflict occurs in two
different situations: when compliance with both state law and the
federal regulatory scheme is not possible,232 and when state law
frustrates Congress's purpose for enacting a particular *'ederal
law. 233
The first type of direct conflict implied preemption is not present
in the instant situation. For this type of preemption to occur, an
intraocular lens manufacturer would have to find it impossible to
simultaneously comply with both the requirements of the Amend-
ments and the paying of state tort judgments. 3 4 Under the MDA, a
228. See supra notes 52-57 and accompanying text (describing the Supreme Court's decision in
Hines).
229. See supra note 24-28 and accompanying text (noting the Framers' concerns with preserv-
ing state autonomy).
230. See supra note 27-28 and accompanying text (citing cases supporting the proposition that
issues relating to health and safety have traditionally been within the competence of the states).
231. See supra note 58-73 and accompanying text (discussing implied preemption based on
direct conflicts between state and federal law).
232. E.g., Hillsborough County v. Automatic Medical Labs., 471 U.S. 707, 713 (1985); Capi-
tal Cities Cable, Inc. v. Crisp, 467 U.S. 691, 699 (1984); Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67
(1941); see also NOWAK & ROTUNDA. supra note 29, at 312 (discussing the preemption test
created by the Hines Court).
233. See supra notes 66-70 and accompanying text (discussing a second type of direct conflict
implied preemption and the Court's decision in Hill).
234. For example, direct conflict occurs where the federal statute requires a manufacturer to do
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manufacturer does not have to prove that its products are safe and
effective before they are used in an investigational setting.23 5 Al-
though paying state tort judgments would require a manufacturer to
do more than is required under the federal statute, it does not force
the manufacturer to violate the federal statute. Thus, because it is
possible to simultaneously comply with the MDA and still pay state
tort claims, implied preemption is not present.
The second type of direct conflict implied preemption is also not
present in the instant situation. For it to occur, the state regulation
at issue must conflict with the federal scheme so as to frustrate its
purpose.2 36 Because requiring manufacturers to pay state tort claims
is consistent with the purpose of the MDA, implied preemption does
not occur.
The legislative history of the Amendments indicates that the pur-
pose of the federal legislation was to protect consumer health and
safety.23 7 Allowing state tort claims actually advances this goal;
holding manufacturers liable for defects in their products gives them
an incentive to produce better and safer products, which results in
the protection of consumer health and safety.2 38 Because there is no
conflict when both the state and federal regulations are working to-
ward the same goal, implied preemption does not occur.
C. The Slater Court Did Not Address the Distinction Between
State Regulation and State Tort Claims
Without considering the language of the preemption provision of
the MDA, the Seventh Circuit held that Mr. Slater's common law
X and the state requirement prohibits the manufacturer from doing X. Because compliance with
the state requirement forces the manufacturer to violate the federal standard, the state require-
ment is preempted.
235. See supra note 101 and accompanying text (setting forth the exemption for investigational
devises under the MDA).
236. See supra notes 66-70 and accompanying text (discussing the Hill decision, which dealt
with direct conflict implied preemption).
237. See supra notes 118-23 and accompanying text (setting forth and discussing the health
and safety concerns pervading the MDA's legislative history). To the extent that it is argued that
the purpose of the Investigational Device Exemption for intraocular lenses was to encourage inno-
vation, Congress has stated that innovation is only to be encouraged in accordance with the pro-
tection of public health and safety. See infra notes 252-53 and accompanying text (describing the
legislative history of the MDA, which illustrates Congress's intent to preserve health and safety
while encouraging innovation); see also supra notes 150-54 and accompanying text (discussing
how the policy of promoting innovation cuts against imposing manufacturer liability).
238. See supra notes 141-44 and accompanying text (discussing the product safety theory of
liability).
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claims were preempted.2 39 This finding was erroneous because the
preemption provision speaks only to conflicting requirements im-
posed by states or political subdivisions; 240 the statute does not pre-
empt common law tort actions.24 1
This interpretation of the statute is supported by the legislative
history of the MDA. A report by the House Committee on Inter-
state and Foreign Commerce indicates that Congress intended to
abolish state regulation relating to the sale and distribution of medi-
cal devices. 242  The report also indicates that Congress was con-
cerned about the burden that would be placed on interstate com-
merce if the states were allowed to impose different regulations.243
In addition, the House Report never even hinted at the MDA's ef-
fect on state common law.244 Because the legislative history only dis-
239. Slater v. Optical Radiation Corp., 961 F.2d 1330, 1333 (7th Cir), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct.
327 (1992). The court stated that although "[tihe plaintiff wishes in the name of state tort law to
impose additional requirements ... [, such] engrafting of additional requirements relating to
safety or effectiveness is forbidden by the preemption provision in the Medical Devices Amend-
ments." Id.
240. For the text of the preemption provision of the Amendments, see supra notes 110-1I1 and
accompanying text.
241. The cases construing similar preemption language also support this statutory interpreta-
tion and hold that where common law claims are not mentioned in the statute, they are preserved.
See supra notes 77-82 and accompanying text (discussing the Ferebee case, wherein the D.C.
Circuit held that a federal statute which did not address state tort claims did not preempt state
damage actions). It should be noted that although Congress did not refer to "court decisions" in
the statute, the regulations at 21 C.F.R. § 808.1(b) (1992) do. The regulations provide:
Section 52 1(a) of the act [21 U.S.C. § 360k(a)] contains special provisions governing
the regulation of devices by States and localities. That section prescribes a general
rule that .. .no State or political subdivision of a State may establish or continue
[to] effect any requirement with respect to a medical device intended for human use
having the force and effect of law (whether established by statute, ordinance, regula-
tion, or court decision), which is different from, or in addition to, any requirement
applicable to such device under any provision of the act and which relates to the
safety or effectiveness of the device or to any other matter included in a requirement
applicable to the device under the act.
Id.
A district court, in Callan v. G.D. Searle & Co., 709 F. Supp. 662 (D. Md. 1989), addressed
this inconsistency between the statute and the implementing regulations and stated: "To the ex-
tent that the FDA's inclusion of the words 'court decision' in its implementing regulations suggests
otherwise, the FDA regulation contradicts congressional intent and is not based on a permissible
construction of the statute." Id. at 668. The Callan court went on to hold that the plain language
of the MDA's preemption provision indicates that Congress intended to preempt state and local
legislation and administrative regulations governing devices, but not state tort law; the court, how-
ever, did not mention whether or not the common law was preempted. Id.
242. 121 CONG. REC. 10,688 (April 17, 1975) (statement of Sen. Kennedy).
243. See supra note 125 and accompanying text (setting forth the Committee's reservations
about the effect of state regulations on interstate commerce).
244. See supra notes 124-25 and accompanying text (discussing the House Report).
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cusses the burden on interstate commerce in light of state and local
regulation, it can be argued that the preemption provision was only
intended to refer to legislative and administrative programs gov-
erning the sale and distribution of devices.
The fact that a federal remedy for those who have been injured
by medical devices does not exist under the MDA also supports the
contention that Congress intended to preserve state law claims.' 4"
The absence of a federal remedy goes directly to whether Congress
intended to preempt state common law tort claims, thus leaving
plaintiffs with no remedy.246 Since the Amendments do not provide
a federal remedy, the Seventh Circuit should not have been so quick
to include state tort actions in the preemption provision.
In further support of the proposition that the preemption provi-
sion was only meant to apply to state regulation is the fact that
states may impose more stringent requirements relating to medical
devices, provided that they apply to the FDA for an exemption.247
State tort judgments can be viewed as more stringent state require-
ments. However, since a state cannot be required to apply for an
exemption after each state tort judgment, it can be argued that the
preemption provision was meant to apply only to state regulation.
The clear language of the preemption provision indicates that
only state regulation was to be preempted. Supporting this interpre-
tation is the legislative history of the MDA, the fact that no federal
remedy exists under the MDA, and the fact that states cannot apply
for an exemption each time they impose a more stringent state re-
quirement in the form of a state tort judgment. Had the Seventh
Circuit considered the distinction between state regulation and state
common law claims, it would have found that Mr. Slater's claims
were indeed preserved.
245. In fact, the cases that have found the existence of preemption despite the fact that state
tort claims were not specified in the statute have allowed preemption only to the extent that the
state tort remedy was displaced by a federal remedy. See supra notes 77-82 and accompanying
text (discussing the Ferebee decision, which held that a federal statute which did not address state
tort claims did not preempt state damage actions).
246. As the Supreme Court stated in Silkwood: "[I]t is difficult to believe that Congress would,
without comment, remove all means of judicial recourse for those injured by illegal conduct."
Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 251 (1984).




D. Slater is Inconsistent With Policy Reasons Favoring
Manufacturer Liability
The decision in Slater is inconsistent with the policy reasons for
holding manufacturers liable for defects in their products. While
there are some policy arguments against imposing liability in the
experimental medical device context, such arguments can be easily
discounted.
Holding manufacturers liable for defects in their products gives
them an incentive to produce better and safer products.248 This is
extremely important in the experimental stage; since experimental
devices are exempted from the usual requirements of establishing
pre-market safety and effectiveness under the FDA guidelines, man-
ufacturers need incentives to make their products safe enough to be
tested on people. Allowing state tort claims advances this goal.
Imposing liability on manufacturers also allows the risks of prod-
ucts to be shifted from the injured plaintiff to everyone who benefits
from the product. 249 The risk-spreading rationale is also very impor-
tant in the experimental medical device context. Because pre-market
testing cannot reveal all the risks in a product, consumers act as
"guinea pigs" during the first few years that a product is marketed.
Since future consumers benefit from the information generated from
use of the product during the experimental period, it is only fair to
impose compensation costs on future consumers. Placing liability on
the manufacturer is a way of passing this cost on to the consumer,
since the cost of injuries can be reflected in the price of the
product.25
In opposition to the imposition of manufacturer liability in the
experimental medical device context is the argument that allowing
state tort claims chills a manufacturer's incentive to produce new
products because of the potential liability costs. 21 Although innova-
tion is indeed a goal to be achieved with respect to experimental
devices, it should not be realized at the expense of health and safety.
Congress considered this very issue when it enacted the Amend-
248. See supra notes 141-44 and accompanying text (discussing the product safety theory of
liability).
249. See supra notes 145-47 and accompanying text (discussing the spreading of losses theory
of imposing liability).
250, See supra note 147 and accompanying text (discussing the theories of cost-shifting and
cost-spreading).
251. See supra note 150-54 and accompanying text (discussing how the allowance of state tort
claims may discourage a manufacturer's innovation).
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ments. The legislative history of the MDA indicates that Congress
did not intend for health and safety to be sacrificed in the name of
new product development. 5 ' The legislative history provides:
The Committee recognizes the necessity to encourage the discovery and de-
velopment of medical devices intended for human use and the need for sci-
entific investigators to maintain freedom to do so. On the other hand, re-
search on medical devices in the developmental stage must not endanger the
public health and must assure the highest ethical standards ... 2
When health and safety concerns run up against the desire to en-
courage new product development, health and safety should prevail.
Second, the policy argument that imposing liability on manufac-
turers second-guesses the FDA is not supported in the experimental
medical device context.2 54 The policy of not second-guessing the
FDA is based on two assumptions: that the FDA is the authoritative
body on the subject that is being regulated, and that the FDA is to
be the sole source of regulation with respect to medical devices.
Neither of these assumptions is valid in the experimental medical
device context.
Because little is known about a product at the experimental stage,
there is in reality no authority regarding that product, not even the
FDA. In fact, to gain the necessary information about experimental
products, the FDA grants exemptions for experimental medical de-
vice testing and use. Thus, while the FDA is generally considered
the governing body with respect to drugs and devices, this is not the
case in the context of experimental products because the FDA ar-
guably does not have superior knowledge to which states and courts
can defer.
The second assumption is that the sole source of regulation with
respect to medical devices should be the FDA; this is also not the
case .with the MDA. The legislation clearly provides that the states
may supplementally regulate medical devices as long as the state
requirements are more stringent than the federal requirements. 5
Thus, the argument that states and courts should defer to the FDA
conflicts with the fact that supplemental state regulation is allowed.
In summary, the policy reasons for imposing liability on manufac-
252. H.R. REP. No. 853, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 12 (1976).
253. Id. at 42.
254. See supra note 155 and accompanying text (discussing the role of the FDA in the medical
device context).
255. See supra note I ll and accompanying text (setting forth and discussing the MDA's re-
quirements for exemption from the federal preemption provision).
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turers for product defects are in line with the goal of preserving tort
claims in the face of preemption. The imposition of liability provides
an incentive for manufacturers to produce safer products. It also
spreads the risk of products to all who benefit from them. While
there may be some policy arguments against imposing liability on
manufacturers in the experimental medical device context, those ar-
guments are easily rebutted.
IV. IMPACT
Like Albert Slater, many people agree to participate in clinical
investigation programs involving experimental medical devices
which sometimes result in injuries to the participants. According to
the Seventh Circuit's decision in Slater, injured participants are
prevented from bringing a cause of action against the manufacturer
of an experimental medical device based on the safety and effective-
ness of the device, and they are therefore divested of any state tort
remedies which would otherwise be available to them. Moreover, the
Medical Device Amendments as they stand today do not provide
any federal remedy for plaintiffs injured by experimental medical
devices.
The most direct impact of this decision is that plaintiffs like Al-
bert Slater are forced to bear the burden of experimental medical
device testing on their own. Clearly, this is not what Congress in-
tended when it enacted the MDA. Not only is this decision inequita-
ble, it is also inappropriate from a policy perspective. Congress did
not intend for the victims of experimental medical testing to bear
the burden of potential injury on their own. This proposition is sup-
ported in the text of the MDA, which contains a consent provision
that preserves a patient's legal rights against a manufacturer. The
fact that such a consent provision exists indicates that Congress did
not intend for participants in the clinical testing context to be forced
to solely bear the burden of experimental testing.
Furthermore, requiring patients to bear the burden of experimen-
tal medical testing is inappropriate from a policy perspective. Such
a result requires an injured plaintiff to bear all of the cost when
there are others who also benefit from the testing. Because future
consumers will benefit from the information generated from use of
the product during the experimental period, it is only fair that they
should share in the cost of developing that information. Placing lia-
bility on the manufacturer is a way of passing this cost on to the
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consumer, since the cost of injuries can be reflected in the price of
the product. Moreover, it is also inappropriate to allow manufactur-
ers to use this legislation to shield themselves from liability for the
very group of people the legislation was designed to protect -
consumers.
It seems that there are two possible alternatives to lifting the bur-
den of experimental medical device testing that Slater imposes: ei-
ther tort claims against manufacturers should be allowed, or a fed-
eral remedy should be provided. Allowing state tort claims would
not only provide plaintiffs with compensation for their injuries but
would also allow the cost of new products to be spread to all of those
who benefit from them. Moreover, the imposition of liability on the
manufacturer would give the manufacturer an incentive to produce
safer products.
A federal compensation system may also be a viable alternative
for dealing with this issue. Congress has enacted such a system in
the past.256 Indeed, this may be the preferable solution since it
would lower the cost of injuries as a whole by avoiding the litigation
expenses that would otherwise be involved in tort claims. Providing
injured plaintiffs with some type of compensation through a federal
system would make the Slater court's finding of preemption a little
easier to accept.
V. CONCLUSION
Under the decision in Slater v. Optical Radiation Corp.,257 plain-
tiffs like Albert Slater are stripped of their state tort remedies for
medical experiments gone awry. Furthermore, the Medical Device
Amendments do not provide a federal remedy for the victims of ex-
perimental medical device mishaps. The MDA was not intended to
insulate manufacturers from liability, thus leaving plaintiffs like Mr.
Slater to bear the burden of experimental medical device testing on
their own. The legislative history indicates that this was not the in-
tended effect; rather, protection of the consumer was of utmost im-
256. The National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986, 42 U.S.C. §§ 300aa-10 to -33
(1992), was established to compensate individuals for injuries or deaths related to the use of child-
hood vaccines. The purpose of the law is to funnel lawsuits out of the overburdened court system
and into a simpler, federally-funded compensation program, thereby lowering manufacturers' in-
surance costs. Sarah Glazer, Vaccine Victims: No-Fault Federal Program Compensates for Inju-
ries, WASH, PosT. Jan. 29, 1991, at Z9.
257. 756 F. Supp. 370 (N.D. 111. 1991), af'd. 961 F.2d 1330 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct.
327 (1992).
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portance. Nevertheless, the Seventh Circuit in Slater avoided fol-
lowing Congress's intent by erroneously concluding that Mr. Slater's
state tort claims were expressly preempted by the Medical Device
Amendments.
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